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INTRODUCTION 
Popular constitutionalism is a bit like the dark matter of the con-
stitutional universe — it seems to exert a powerful force on constitu-
tional theory and doctrine, but even those who believe in it are not  
always entirely sure how it works.  Do “the people” influence constitu-
tional interpretation through elections?  Impeachments?  Mob rule?  
This Response considers another possible answer: the people  
act through the state attorneys general (SAGs), who have played  
a prominent role in the Court’s recent Second Amendment cases  
and the ongoing challenges to the constitutionality of health care 
reform. 
1 her trenchant analysis of popular constitutionalism in District 
of Columbia v. Heller,2 Professor Reva Siegel persuasively argued  
that “Heller’s originalism enforces understandings of the Second 
Amendment that were forged in the late twentieth century through 
popular constitutionalism.”3  Those understandings resurfaced in 
McDonald v. City of Chicago,4 thanks in part to SAGs, thirty-eight  
of whom argued that the Amendment should be incorporated against 
the states.5
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
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 1 Reva B. Siegel, Dead or Alive: Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism in Heller, 122 
HARV. L. REV. 191 (2008). 
 2 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
  Although the SAGs invoked federalism, their arguments 
owe more to popular constitutionalism than to the interests of the  
states qua states.  And by effectively recasting themselves as the 
people’s attorneys general, the SAGs helped solve popular constitutio-
nalism’s problem of institutional design even as they raised new ques-
tions about their own responsibilities as representatives of the states 
themselves. 
 
 3 Siegel, supra note 1, at 192. 
 4 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010).   
 5 Brief of the State of Texas et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, McDonald v. 
City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010) (No. 08-1521) [hereinafter SAG Amicus Brief], available at 
http://www.chicagoguncase.com/wp-content/uploads/2009/11/08-1521-tsac-state-of-texas.pdf. 
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I.  POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE SECOND 
AMENDMENT 
Popular constitutionalism comes in many forms, ranging from ex-
tremely strong — that “[t]he People have ultimate authority to interp-
ret and enforce the Constitution”6 — to relatively weak — that the 
people should be free to invoke constitutional principles independent 
of those enforced by the courts.7  The theory has proven normatively 
and descriptively attractive in part because it recognizes a democratic 
element in constitutional interpretation and builds on rich social and 
historical accounts like Siegel’s.  Though accounts of popular constitu-
tionalism vary in their particulars, they are all connected by the notion 
that “the people” have a role to play in constitutional interpretation.8
Exactly how the people do so is not always clear, as both propo-
nents and critics of popular constitutionalism have noted.  David Po-
zen writes that “hardly any attention has been paid to questions of in-
stitutional design,”
 
9 and Professors Larry Alexander and Lawrence 
Solum point out that “[t]he obvious question for robust popular consti-
tutionalism is ‘How?’  How can the people themselves interpret and 
enforce the Constitution through direct action?”10  Mob rule is the 
proverbial hot porridge, but merely encouraging public dialogue seems 
too cold.  Judicial impeachment and constitutional amendment are too 
cumbersome for all but the most prominent constitutional issues, while 
judicial elections are accessible11 but create a whole new set of prob-
lems.12
Although popular constitutionalism’s inner workings remain largely 
unexplained, many scholars have argued persuasively that some form 
of popular constitutionalism played an important — if uncredited — 
role in Heller.
 
13
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 6 Larry Alexander & Lawrence B. Solum, Popular? Constitutionalism?, 118 HARV. L. REV. 
1594, 1603 (2005) (reviewing LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR 
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004) and describing and criticizing this view). 
 7 Mark Tushnet, Popular Constitutionalism As Political Law, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 991, 
991 (2006). 
 8 See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Judicial Supremacy and the Modest Constitution, 92 CALIF. L. 
REV. 1045, 1050 n.26 (2004) (describing popular constitutionalism as “the view that the people 
should have a major role to play in constitutional interpretation”). 
 9 David E. Pozen, Judicial Elections as Popular Constitutionalism, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 
2047, 2049 (2010). 
  Popular constitutionalism also seems to have been a 
 10 Alexander & Solum, supra note 6, at 1635. 
 11 See Pozen, supra note 9, at 2050. 
 12 See generally David E. Pozen, The Irony of Judicial Elections, 108 COLUM. L. REV.  
265 (2008). 
 13 See, e.g., Siegel, supra note 1; Cass R. Sunstein, Second Amendment Minimalism: Heller As 
Griswold, 122 HARV. L. REV. 246, 266 (2008); Anders Walker, From Ballots to Bullets: District of 
Columbia v. Heller and the New Civil Rights, 69 LA. L. REV. 509, 510–11 (2009); Jack Balkin, 
“This Decision Will Cost American Lives”: A Note on Heller and the Living Constitution, 
 
  
110 HARVARD LAW REVIEW FORUM [Vol. 122:108 
force in McDonald, thanks in part to the efforts of the thirty-eight 
SAGs who filed an amicus brief urging the Court to incorporate the 
Second Amendment against the states.14  (Thirty-one SAGs had done 
the same in Heller, even though that case involved a federal law and 
thus did not present the issue of incorporation.15)  As in Heller, the 
Court’s approach in McDonald was largely originalist.  The plurality 
noted that incorporation of a right is not solely dependent on “popular 
consensus,” but went on to say that “in this case, as it turns out, there 
is evidence of such a consensus.”16  The plurality pointed to the SAGs’ 
amicus brief and a similar brief filed by 58 Members of the Senate and 
251 Members of the House of Representatives as providing that evi-
dence.17
Such reliance on SAGs as a medium of popular constitutionalism 
has a lot of intuitive appeal.  After all, SAGs are elected by popular 
vote in forty-three states,
  In other words, the Court read the SAGs’ amicus brief as a 
statement of “popular” constitutional values, not as evidence of the 
states’ own interests. 
18 and many go on to seek other elected offic-
es, so they have strong incentives to be seen as representing the will  
of the people.  Those incentives certainly seemed to be at work in 
McDonald — nearly three-quarters of Americans support the individ-
ual rights interpretation of the Second Amendment that the SAGs 
asked the Court to apply against the states.19  And as something of a 
federalism bonus, recognizing the SAGs’ role in popular constitutional-
ism gives state officials a role in the development of federal constitu-
tional doctrine.  Of course, it also means preserving federal courts’ 
central role in constitutional interpretation, but that role is not neces-
sarily incompatible with robust popular constitutionalism.20
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
BALKINIZATION (June 27, 2008, 12:08 AM), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2008/06/this-decision-
will-cost-american-lives.html; Adam Winkler, Justice Scalia’s Living Constitution, THE 
HUFFINGTON POST (June 27, 2008, 9:17 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/adam-
winkler/justice-scalias-living-co_b_109728.html. 
 
 14 SAG Amicus Brief, supra note 5, at 10. 
 15 Brief of the State of Texas et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent at 23 n.6,  
District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (No. 07-290), available at http:// 
www.gurapossessky.com/news/parker/documents/07-290bsacTexas.pdf.   
 16 McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3049 (2010) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 17 Id. (citing Brief for Amici Curiae Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison et al. in Support of Peti-
tioners at 4, McDonald, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (No. 08-1521), 2009 WL 4099522). 
 18 About NAAG, NAT’L ASS’N OF ATT’YS GEN., http://www.naag.org/about_naag.php (last 
visited Dec. 12, 2010) (noting that SAGs are popularly elected in forty-three states and selected by 
various procedures in the other seven). 
 19 See Jeffrey M. Jones, Public Believes Americans Have Right to Own Guns, GALLUP  
(Mar. 27, 2008), http://www.gallup.com/poll/105721/Public-Believes-Americans-Right-Own-
Guns.aspx.   
 20 See generally Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Popular Constitutionalism, Departmentalism, and 
Judicial Supremacy, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 1027 (2004) (defending judicial supremacy). 
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A complete account of the SAGs’ role in popular constitutionalism 
would need to deal with state-level separation of powers concerns, the 
constitutional rhetoric and informational content of SAG election cam-
paigns, and other limitations.  Even so, SAGs clearly have some poten-
tially powerful strengths as representatives of the people’s constitu-
tional interests.  Are they, at long last, a mechanism of popular 
constitutionalism that is both practically feasible and normatively de-
sirable? 
II.  THE PEOPLE’S ATTORNEYS GENERAL? 
Behind this flowery picture of SAGs representing the people’s con-
stitutional values lies a thorny question: aren’t SAGs supposed to 
stand up for the states?  They are, after all, state attorneys general, 
and usually invoke and argue for the importance of federalism and 
state sovereignty.21
From a popular constitutionalism perspective, the SAGs’ argument 
makes a lot of sense, for all the reasons described above.  And yet their 
brief was also, as Justice Stevens noted in dissent, somewhat “puz-
zling,”
  By supporting incorporation in McDonald, how-
ever, the SAGs effectively sought to expand the federal judiciary’s 
power over the states.  What does that decision say about SAGs’ rela-
tive commitments to popular constitutionalism and to federalism?  
22 at least if one believes that the SAGs’ role is to speak for the 
states themselves.  States do not need federal judges to stop them from 
passing or enforcing gun control laws, after all.  And if a state wants to 
entrench its current opposition to gun control against future changes, it 
can do so through its own constitution, over which its own judges 
have final interpretive authority.  In fact, all the states that signed the 
McDonald amicus brief (and all but a handful of the states that did 
not) already guarantee an “individual” right to keep and bear arms in 
their own constitutions, often in terms more expansive than those of 
the Second Amendment.23
Perhaps the difficulty of identifying a state interest in incorporation 
led the SAGs to invoke the interests of the people instead.  In an un-
successful effort to get oral argument time in McDonald, the SAGs ar-
gued that states are uniquely positioned because they are both “sove-
reign governmental entities” and “guardians of their citizens’ 
 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 21 Sean Nicholson-Crotty, State Merit Amicus Participation and Federalism Outcomes in the 
U.S. Supreme Court, 37 PUBLIUS 599, 604 (2007) (“Ninety three percent of amicus briefs filed by 
states were supportive of state power.”).  
 22 McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3115 n.47 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 23 See generally Eugene Volokh, State Constitutional Rights to Keep and Bear Arms, 11 TEX. 
REV. L. & POL. 191 (2006).   
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constitutional rights.”24  But those two roles are not always aligned, 
and the SAGs ultimately embraced the latter.  That choice is why the 
McDonald plurality cited the SAGs’ brief as evidence of “popular con-
sensus,”25
The SAGs attempted to minimize this tension, arguing that “amici 
States are particularly concerned when the Court engages in constitu-
tional or statutory interpretation that implicates federalism issues.  The 
incorporation of the Second Amendment presents no such concerns.”
 while Justice Stevens was puzzled by the lack of a coherent 
state interest. 
26  
The three amici SAGs opposing incorporation called this argument 
“absurd”27 and noted that “incorporation would strip decision-making 
from state legislatures and courts and place it in the hands of federal 
courts,”28 a federalism issue if ever there was one.  Incorporation 
would likely impose a single federal standard on the states, thereby li-
miting their ability to serve as laboratories for experimentation and 
achieve the other benefits generally associated with federalism.  If any-
thing, the thirty-eight SAGs’ brief seems to be not an argument from 
federalism, but an effort to use federal constitutional law to entrench 
the SAGs’ preferences or impose them on other states — a form of 
“horizontal aggrandizement.”29
Whatever the merits of the SAGs’ argument, incorporation is ex-
tremely difficult to justify on the federalism grounds they invoked.  
First, the SAGs argued that the states needed federal judges’ help to 
protect state citizens from local governments: “Unless the ruling of the 
court of appeals below is reversed, millions of Americans will be de-
prived of their Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms as a 
result of actions by local governments, such as the ordinances chal-
lenged in this case.”
 
30  This warning sounds ominous, but is uncon-
vincing.  It is true and unsurprising that the most stringent gun control 
regulations are generally found at the local level: Heller and McDo-
nald both involved handgun bans enacted by cities, while no state has 
such a regulation.31
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 24 Motion for Leave to Participate in Oral Argument and for Divided Argument at 2 (Dec. 17, 
2009), McDonald, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (No. 08-1521), available at http://volokh.com/wp/wp-
content/uploads/2009/12/mcdonaldamicusmotion.pdf. 
 25 McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3048–49 (plurality opinion).   
  But the showdown between state and local au-
thorities over gun rights is less dramatic than it sounds, since states 
 26 SAG Amicus Brief, supra note 5, at 23. 
 27 Brief for the State of Illinois et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 18, McDo-
nald, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (No. 08-1521) [hereinafter Illinois Amicus Brief], available at 
http://www.chicagoguncase.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/01/08-1521-bsac-state-of-illinois.pdf. 
 28 Id. at 7. 
 29 Lynn A. Baker & Ernest A. Young, Federalism and the Double Standard of Judicial  
Review, 51 DUKE L.J. 75, 110 (2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 30 SAG Amicus Brief, supra note 5, at 1. 
 31 Id. at 21 (“[E]very State in the Union permits private handgun ownership.”). 
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can simply preempt some or all local gun control, as all of the thirty-
eight states arguing in favor of incorporation (plus seven more) have 
done.32
Second, the SAGs argued that “[e]nforcement of the Second 
Amendment right to keep and bear arms against state and local gov-
ernments is especially important in an era of robust interstate travel 
and commerce,”
 
33 invoking Saenz v. Roe34 and the constitutional right 
to travel.  This argument is weightier than the first.  Some states surely 
do want to make it easier for their citizens to cross borders while bear-
ing arms, even though other states would doubtless argue that locally 
tailored gun control is necessary to make travel safe.  But harm to ro-
bust interstate travel and commerce is not itself a strong standalone ar-
gument for incorporation.  Restrictions on the right to travel can and 
should be litigated as such, not as infringements on other constitution-
al rights.  Were it otherwise, Saenz — which struck down a California 
law conditioning welfare benefits on a person’s length of residence in 
the state35
Third, the SAGs claimed to have “an interest in the proper inter-
pretation of the Second Amendment in order to facilitate the develop-
ment of similar protections under state law.  Interpretive guidance 
from this Court, and from other federal courts, would help the States 
as they construe and enforce their own, analogous state-law protec-
tions.”
 — would stand for a constitutional right to welfare benefits, 
rather than a right to travel. 
36  This argument, too, seems misplaced.  If state courts want 
“interpretive guidance” from federal courts, they can get it whether or 
not the Second Amendment is incorporated.  Indeed, as a matter of 
practice, state courts typically interpret their own constitutional provi-
sions in lockstep with federal doctrine.37  Of course, in the specific 
context of the “individual” right to bear arms, the borrowing should 
arguably go the other way, since the state courts have a better devel-
oped jurisprudence on the subject than the federal courts do.38
Perhaps the SAGs simply meant that an incorporated Second 
Amendment would create more federal cases to which state courts 
could look for guidance.  But as a practical matter it is likely that in-
corporation will not “facilitate the development” of state law, but ra-
 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 32 Illinois Amicus Brief, supra note 27, at 21. 
 33 SAG Amicus Brief, supra note 5, at 1. 
 34 526 U.S. 489 (1999). 
 35 See id. at 510–11. 
 36 SAG Amicus Brief, supra note 5, at 2. 
 37 Robert K. Fitzpatrick, Note, Neither Icarus nor Ostrich: State Constitutions as an Indepen-
dent Source of Individual Rights, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1833, 1850 (2004) (“Despite . . . criticism, the 
lockstep approach remains the most common approach to state constitutionalism.”). 
 38 See generally Adam Winkler, Scrutinizing the Second Amendment, 105 MICH. L. REV. 683 
(2007). 
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ther displace it.  If, for example, the federal courts establish a Second 
Amendment standard of review more stringent than the “reasonable-
ness” standard unanimously favored by state courts,39 the states’ own 
jurisprudence will probably wither, just as it has in many other areas 
of constitutional law.  Given the Heller majority’s apparent rejection 
of the states’ preferred reasonableness test,40
This Response attempts to show that SAGs play an important but 
underappreciated role in popular constitutionalism; it argues that this 
role may force SAGs to choose between the will of the people and the 
interests of the states qua states.  In McDonald, at least, the SAGs in-
voked the latter but actually argued for the former.  Should popular 
constitutionalists be celebrating, concerned, or confused?  Perhaps the 
short shrift given to state interests in the Second Amendment context 
demonstrates that critics of federalism are right, and that state identity 
simply matters less than it used to.  Perhaps we are finally getting over 
our “national neurosis.”
 such a result is not un-
likely. 
CONCLUSION 
41
The national constitutional debate has shifted from the Second 
Amendment to the constitutionality of healthcare reform, but the is-
sues explored in this Response remain central.  Once again, “the 
people” are debating the meaning of the Constitution, grounding their 
arguments in terms of federalism and individual freedom.  And once 
again, SAGs are on the front lines, simultaneously invoking the impor-
tance of state sovereignty
  Or perhaps federalism still matters, just not 
as much as gun rights. 
42 and the sanctity of individual liberty,43
But the SAGs’ involvement in the health care challenges also casts 
further light on the potential tension between the will of the people 
and the interests of the states qua states.  In these cases, the tension is 
minimized, since the will of the people (some of them anyway) and the 
 
while couching their arguments in constitutional — not simply politi-
cal — terms.  Their participation supports the idea that SAGs may be 
a partial answer to the problem of institutional design in popular con-
stitutionalism. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 39 Id. at 686–87. 
 40 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 631 (2008). 
 41 See Edward L. Rubin & Malcom Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 
41 UCLA L. REV. 903 (1994). 
 42 See, e.g., States Launch Lawsuits Against Healthcare Plan, REUTERS, Mar. 22, 2010, avail-
able at http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE62L3B820100322. 
 43 See, e.g., Hank Silverberg, Virginia AG Argues for Health Care Repeal on Hill, WTOP (Feb. 
16, 2011), http://www.wtop.com/?nid=120&sid=2274403 (quoting Virginia Attorney General Ken 
Cuccinelli as saying, “[t]he litigation is not so much about health care as it is about liberty”). 
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interests of the states are — at least arguably — more aligned, allow-
ing SAGs to invoke the two interchangeably.  Whatever the merits of 
their constitutional arguments, the fact that the SAGs have sought to 
increase federal power over state gun regulation but limit federal pow-
er over health care demonstrates their role in popular constitutionalism 
and their surprisingly complex relationships with the states themselves. 
